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A working procedure for identifying emerging food safety issues at an early stage: Implications for European and international risk management practices

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1 **A working procedure for identifying emerging food**
2 **safety issues at an early stage: Implications for**
3 **European and international risk management practices**

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18
19 **Abstract**

20 There is a need for early identification of emerging food safety issues in order to prevent them from
21 developing into health risks. In this paper, various existing methods and procedures which can be
22 used for early identification of safety issues are reviewed, including the monitoring of the occurrence of
23 specific hazards within the food supply, or the incidences of food-borne diseases, as well as the
24 combination of these data with other data or with expert opinions. Some methods, including Hazard
25 Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP), operate pro-actively by pre-defining indicators for hazards
26 and follow-up measures. Vulnerability assessment focuses on potential weak spots within the food

Emerging food safety issue identification

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27 supply, whilst futures research employs foresight to enhance preparedness for future hazards and
28 risks. A Delphi survey on food safety risk analysis conducted among professionals revealed concerns
29 with various aspects of current procedures for dealing with emerging issues, and these are discussed.
30 The Delphi respondents also attached great value to the involvement of stakeholders and the inclusion
31 of a broader range of data into risk analysis. Indeed, holistic systems employing indicators from
32 outside the food production chain are now being developed. In conclusion, a four-step procedure for
33 the early identification of emerging issues is proposed.

34

35 **Key words**

36 Food safety, emerging risks, early warning, risk analysis, holistic, indicator

37

38 **Running title**

39 Emerging food safety issue identification

40

41 **Abbreviations**

42 AFFA, Australian Authorities for Veterinary Health; BSE, bovine spongiform encephalopathy; CARVER,
43 Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognisability; CDC, Centres for
44 Disease Control and Prevention; CDTR, Communicable Disease Threat Reports; DAFF, Australian
45 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry; DEFRA, UK Department of Environment, Food, and
46 Rural Affairs; EC, European Community; ECDC, European Centres for Disease Control and
47 Prevention; EFSA, European Food Safety Authority; ER, emerging risk; ERDSS, Emerging Risk
48 Detection Support System; EU, European Union; Eurostat, Statistical Office of the EU; EW, early
49 warning; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organisation; FVO, Food and Veterinary Office of the European
50 Commission; GF-TAD, Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary Animal
51 Diseases; GOARN, Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network; HACCP, Hazard Analysis Critical
52 Control Points; INFOSAN, International Food Safety Authorities Network; OIE, World Organisation for
53 Animal Health; RASFF, Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed; SINAPSE, EU network for Scientific
54 Information and Expertise for Policy Support in Europe; UK, United Kingdom; US, United States;

55 USDA APHIS CEI, US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Centre
56 for Emerging Issues; WHO, World Health Organisation

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84 1. Introduction

85 The occurrence of various national, European, and international food safety issues over the last few
86 decades has arguably resulted in a decline in public trust in food safety regulation and management
87 inside and outside Europe (e.g. Houghton et al., 2008). Prominent examples of issues that have
88 emerged over the last decade include bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE; Reilly, 1999; Smith,
89 Young, & Gibson, 1999), genetically modified foods (Frewer, Lassen, Kettlitz, Scholderer, Beekman &
90 Berdal, 2004), dioxins (Verbeke, 2001) and acrylamide (Claus, Carle & Schieber, 2008), whilst the
91 actual risk that these issues are known to pose to consumer health varies widely.

92

93 The process of decision-making applied to risk has been termed “risk analysis.” This process entails
94 three interrelated steps, namely *risk assessment*, *risk management*, and *risk communication*.

95 According to internationally accepted principles and definitions, *risk assessment* is the “scientific
96 evaluation of known or potential adverse health effects resulting from human exposure to food-borne
97 hazards” (FAO / WHO, 1995). It includes “the identification of the attendant uncertainties of the
98 likelihood and severity of an adverse effect(s) and /or event(s) occurring that may have an impact on
99 humans, food producing animals, or the environment, following exposure” (EU, 2000). Risk
100 assessment entails the following steps: 1) hazard identification; 2) hazard characterisation; 3)
101 exposure assessment; and 4) risk characterisation. “Hazard” is thus defined as “a biological, chemical,
102 or physical agent in – or property of – food that may have an adverse health effect,” and “risk” as “a
103 function of the probability of an adverse effect and the magnitude of that effect, consequential to a
104 hazard in food” (FAO / WHO, 1995). *Risk management* is defined as “the process of weighing policy
105 alternatives in the light of the result of risk assessment(s), together with other relevant evaluations,
106 and (if required), of selecting and implementing appropriate control options” (EU, 2000). This includes,
107 where appropriate, monitoring and / or surveillance activities. *Risk communication* is defined as “the
108 interactive exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and risk management activities”
109 among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers, and other interested parties (EU, 2000). Interaction
110 should occur between all three components of the model (FAO / WHO, 1995; FAO / WHO, 1997; EU,
111 2000).

112

113 To date, the analysis of food safety issues has been confined to scientific experts in risk assessment
114 and professional risk managers, with very limited formal input from other interested parties, such as
115 consumer organisations, non-governmental organisations, industry, or indeed, consumers themselves
116 (Wentholt, Rowe, Konig & Frewer, 2008). Furthermore, risk analysis has tended to focus on the
117 assessment of health risk, but has taken only limited account of the potentially relevant social,
118 economic, and ethical aspects that may, nonetheless, have direct implications for optimising risk-
119 management practices.

120

121 To improve some of the shortcomings of the present risk analysis process, the EU 6th Framework
122 project SAFE FOODS was initiated in 2004. The overall objective of SAFE FOODS is to change the
123 scope of decision-making on food safety from single risks to consider foods as the sources of risks,
124 benefits, and costs that are associated with their production and consumption. In addition, optimisation
125 of risk governance practices should arguably take into account the social context in which decisions
126 are made¹. Another significant food risk issue that potentially could be improved in the traditional risk
127 analysis approach (identified during the development of the SAFE FOODS framework) concerns the
128 identification of emerging risks. As a consequence of failures in preventing various food safety
129 incidents in the recent past, it is currently recognised that there is a need for rapid identification of food
130 safety risks at an early stage. This paper aims to describe some innovations relevant to the
131 development of a working procedure for identifying emerging food safety risks², thereby extending a
132 previously published report on indicators for such risks (Kleter and Marvin, 2008).

133

134 In the subsequent sections, different approaches for identifying emerging risks are categorised and
135 critiqued, and recommendations are provided for improving activities in this important area. Table 1
136 compares and contrasts these different types of systems and their main characteristics.

¹ The SAFE FOODS project (www.safefoods.nl) aims to develop improved inputs into food risk analysis across five aspects of food safety risk assessment, including: i) the development of new analytical tools by adapting modern profiling technologies for use on food; ii) the improvement of models for understanding population level health impacts of combined exposures to beneficial nutrients and natural and chemical toxicants; iii) the design of a new working procedure for early identification of emerging microbial and chemical risks; iv) an investigation of the role of the different EU institutions involved in the governance of food safety; and v) the development of more effective communication strategies for the exchange of information between experts, regulators and relevant stakeholders, including the public.

² Reflecting research within work package 2 of SAFE FOODS

137

138

139

Insert Table 1 about here

140

141 **2. Present early warning (EW) systems and their applicability as emerging risk (ER) systems**

142 **2.1. Hazard-identification-based systems**

143 ***2.1.1. Hazard- and disease-recording systems***

144 The safety of the European food and feed supply is aided by various early warning systems that
145 monitor the occurrence of hazards within the food production chain, as well as the outbreak of animal
146 and human diseases after consumption of problematic foods. Examples of monitoring systems for
147 hazards within the food production chain include national and regional programs for the control and
148 detection of the presence of illegal substances or unacceptable concentrations of chemicals or
149 pathogenic micro-organisms in food and feed. A notable example of this is the EU Rapid Alert System
150 for Food and Feed (RASFF), which lists the food safety hazards identified by its members, including
151 EU member state authorities (EU, 2008a). RASFF provides for the establishment and maintenance of
152 a communication platform through which members can alert each other about relevant food hazards.
153 This procedure of notification *via* a centralised database enables “early warning” systems to be made
154 operational by allowing other members to instigate protection systems against certain hazards that
155 may be disseminated from one member state. In addition, RASFF overviews are published weekly on
156 a publicly accessible website, which also features annual reports that highlight conspicuous trends in
157 the pertinent year. Another way of using RASFF data for identification of emerging hazards has been
158 employed by Kleter, Prandini, Filippi & Marvin (2008b), who analysed four years of RASFF data
159 retrospectively in order to identify the occurrence of specific, longer-term trends, such as increasing
160 numbers of notifications involving food contact substances. They also noted that national and EU
161 authorities had already been aware of these trends and taken measures to optimise protection of the
162 relevant food chains.

163

164 Systems that focus on outbreaks of food-borne disease after consumption include epidemiological and
165 surveillance systems for human and animal disease and for the prevalence of microbiological

166 pathogens associated with disease incidences. It is noteworthy that various national and regional
167 centres for disease registration and surveillance, such as the American (CDC) and European (ECDC)
168 Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, as well as the World Health Organisation (WHO), have in
169 place systems that are wholly or partially devoted to food-borne diseases. An example of this is the
170 Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN), which forms part of the International Food
171 Safety Authorities Network (INFOSAN) hosted by WHO, through which member state authorities can
172 report food-borne disease outbreaks in real time using a computerised network (WHO, 2006). The
173 same applies to animal health reporting supervised by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE),
174 which is currently setting up the Global Framework for the Progressive Control of Transboundary
175 Animal Diseases (GF-TAD) in order to facilitate early warnings and mitigating measures [in
176 cooperation with the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and WHO; Lubroth, 2006]. This extends
177 the existing framework inside OIE to report animal diseases that are emerging and / or relevant to
178 other member states. Besides early detection through improved awareness of food-borne diseases
179 among health professionals, analytical identification methodologies, and reporting systems, these
180 surveillance systems also allow for retrospective analysis for the detection of more gradual, long-term
181 trends. A detailed overview of these and other monitoring and surveillance systems has been
182 presented by Marvin, Kleter, Prandini, Dekkers & Bolton (2008).

183 **2.1.2. Systems combining food safety with other data**

184 Besides monitoring food hazards *per se* within the food production chain, various early warning
185 methodologies that extend beyond monitoring activities have incorporated monitoring data into their
186 systems. For example, data obtained from monitoring for contaminations of cereals with mycotoxins
187 (toxic compounds formed by moulds) have provided the basis for the development of predictive
188 systems for contamination with either mycotoxins or moulds.

189

190 One example of this is the Wheat Fusarium Head Blight Prediction Centre in the United States (US;
191 PSU, 2008). Fusarium Head Blight is the plant disease caused by infection of wheat kernels by the
192 mould *Fusarium graminearum*, which under certain conditions can also produce the mycotoxin
193 deoxynivalenol (DON). Visitors of the centre's website can check the predicted risk of Fusarium Head
194 Blight using interactive maps of a number of wheat-growing states in the US, with map colours
195 indicating the risk within a region, *i.e.* from green indicating a low risk to red indicating a high risk. In

196 this way, growers can estimate if fungicide treatment is warranted. In addition, wheat growers,
197 handlers, and traders of the harvested wheat can better prepare themselves for the occurrence of
198 contaminations in the harvest. The model used to predict the risk relies on data on temperature and
199 humidity in the week before flowering of the wheat crop, provided by the National Weather Service,
200 and extends upon previous experience gained with similar models (e.g. De Wolf, Madden, & Lipps,
201 2003). Other factors considered include the type of wheat (spring *versus* winter wheat) and the
202 resistance of the wheat variety grown. Based on these inputs, the model predicts if there is a risk of
203 reproduction of the mould prior to flowering. After flowering and during kernel development, further
204 growth of the mould will be favoured by several days of rainfall at moderate temperature, but this stage
205 is not considered by the model (PSU, 2008). Various other models predicting mould formation based
206 on meteorological data have also been developed, adapted to the local circumstances elsewhere (e.g.
207 in Europe or Argentina; Prandini, Sigolo, Filippi, Battilani & Piva, 2008).

208

209 Nonetheless, infection with mould may not always correlate with mycotoxin formation. Currently, there
210 is one known commercially applied model for prediction of mycotoxin (DON) contamination of wheat,
211 *i.e.* DONcast® (Schaafsma and Hooker, 2007). This model has been applied in Canada and Uruguay
212 for a number of years and its applicability for other regions is also being tested. The underlying model
213 considers the climatic and agronomic variables that occur within so-called critical time windows
214 several days before and after flowering of the cereal (Schaafsma and Hooker, 2007).

215

216 Another interesting initiative from the perspective of combining monitoring data with outcomes from
217 other surveys is that of Eurostat (the statistical office of the EU). Eurostat is currently compiling a
218 database with data “from farm to fork” that may be used to show trends and developments associated
219 with various steps in the production-consumption chain in Europe. Besides the outcomes of food
220 safety monitoring programs within the EU, these data also include, among others, the numbers of food
221 inspections carried out, trade statistics, and health records. Statistical analysis of this database may
222 not only provide risk assessors and managers with a comprehensive set of data to inform
223 management decisions, but also provide indicators for the early identification of emerging hazards
224 (DISA, 2008).

225

226 As part of anti-bioterrorism measures, the US authorities have developed strategies focusing on
227 “situational awareness.” This entails the real-time measurement of food safety hazards throughout the
228 production chain. In addition, other measurements are included in the assessment, such as the extent
229 to which food products and ingredients can be traced, environmental waste streams within the food
230 production chain, public health reports, and accounts of “food tampering” or malicious interference with
231 the safety of food. Real-time measurements of food hazards will be facilitated by advanced
232 technologies for identification of products and for the analysis of food hazards contained within these
233 products. To automate the accommodation and interpretation of the data flow from these
234 measurements, computer algorithms similar to Internet search engines can be applied (Lindberg,
235 Grimes & Giles, 2005).

236

237 The combination of monitoring data with other data pertaining either to the relevant hazard or to the
238 product affected by the risk allows risk professionals to place the detected hazards into broader
239 perspective, allowing for further distinction between true increases in the frequency of a given hazard
240 and “false positives.”

241 **2.1.3. Systems involving data recording and expert opinion**

242 In addition to actually collecting data (e.g. collating reports from laboratories performing routine
243 analyses, or publications including those found on the Internet), filtering and interpreting the huge
244 amount of available information associated with emerging food risks represents one of the main
245 challenges to the success or otherwise of any system designed to warn authorities of an emerging
246 food hazard. Human judgement plays an important role both in identifying and collecting data, as well
247 as in filtering and interpreting it. Retrospective studies of recent food safety incidents have clearly
248 shown that lack of compliance to syndrome-reporting procedures, together with lack of knowledge and
249 ignorance of signals, has compromised existing food safety warning systems, leading to the
250 development of food safety issues (VWA, 2006; Hagenaaers et al., 2006).

251

252 The sharing of information and knowledge is a significant driver in proposals to overcome the problem
253 of misinterpretation and ignorance of emerging risk signals. Thus the European Commission has
254 established an open electronic network, the EU network for Scientific Information and Expertise for
255 Policy Support in Europe (SINAPSE), which enables persons and organisations to post warnings and

256 discuss pertinent scientific issues in a protected area (EU, 2008b). The European Commission, in its
257 publication “First report on the Harmonisation of Risk Assessment Procedures” (EU, 2000),
258 emphasised that new food safety problems may be identified by non-governmental organisations
259 (including consumer groups and the mass media), though transparency regarding *how* and *when* such
260 identified concerns should trigger the formulation of a pertinent risk management question and
261 subsequent risk assessment requires improvement.

262

263 An example of a working procedure involving expert opinions on reported hazards that has already
264 been made operational is the Communicable Disease Threat Reports (CDTRs) of the ECDC. CDTRs
265 feature threats identified by public health authorities within and outside the EU, including those
266 mentioned in information provided on the Internet, which may also include unconfirmed reports of
267 emerging food risks. Importantly, the public health surveillance and epidemiological activities of the
268 ECDC do not act as a substitute for national programmes, but aim to complement them. If diseases
269 are observed in one EU member state, which may have implications for other member states, this will
270 be reported through ECDC, which also maintains an Early Warning and Response System, and keeps
271 contacts with other alert systems like RASFF.

272

273 An example of how ECDC identifies emerging issues has been described in a recently published
274 report on the increased incidence of norovirus, which resulted in the ECDC convening a meeting with
275 experts on this issue (ECDC, 2006). The meeting focused particularly on the occurrence of norovirus
276 outbreaks on cruise ships, as this is considered an important route for the global dissemination and
277 emergence of new norovirus strains. The conclusions of this meeting included recommendations to
278 develop a common approach towards coordinated responses to outbreaks in cruise ships and to
279 develop guidelines for the prevention of infection with noroviruses. The experience gained by the
280 American authorities with monitoring of- and control measures against noroviruses in cruise ships can
281 be shared for this purpose. Similar principles apply to other settings where norovirus infections also
282 frequently occur, such as hospitals. With regard to the first recommendation for developing a common
283 approach towards control on cruise ships, ECDC also participates in the EU-sponsored SHIPSAN
284 project, aiming at developing a common approach for ship sanitation in Europe. It is also worth noting

285 that ECDC leads the DIVINE-NET project, which monitors for food-borne viral diseases, including
286 noroviruses, in Europe (ECDC, 2006).

287 **2.1.4. One-off stakeholder and expert events**

288 Besides the inclusion of experts' opinions and observations in databases, as discussed in the previous
289 sections, experts may sometimes be called upon to contribute their knowledge on, for example,
290 hazard identification, during the course of one-off stakeholder events. An example of how experts may
291 help identify and prioritise hazards is provided in the report of the "expert choice session" on food
292 safety hazards associated with farmed salmon (VWA, 2005). In this exercise, the experts who
293 participated in a meeting convened by the Dutch National Food and Consumer Product Authority were
294 able to name hazards associated with salmon farming and assign priorities regarding resource
295 allocation directed towards risk mitigation to them. For example, the highest priority in farmed salmon
296 was assigned to residues of environmental organochlorine contaminants, followed by the bacterial
297 pathogen *Listeria monocytogenes*, noxious metals (e.g. organic mercury, inorganic arsenic, lead,
298 cadmium), antibiotic residues, and various other hazards, respectively (VWA, 2005).

299
300 Another, prominent example is that of the European Food Safety Authority's (EFSA) activities involving
301 stakeholders in the identification or prioritisation of food safety issues. EFSA's Stakeholder
302 Consultative Platform, which was established in 2005, consists of representatives of various EU-wide
303 organisations that are active within EFSA's remit and that have no legal obligations to EFSA. This
304 platform is to provide a forum for dialogue and exchange. It advises EFSA's management on a number
305 of general issues, including emerging and key issues on food safety, as well as the organisation of
306 stakeholder events. These events include the consultations of larger groups of stakeholders, either
307 through meetings or through the web-based posting of documents developed by EFSA for feedback.
308 Examples of topics of recently held consultations include meetings on animal welfare aspects of
309 aquaculture systems, and risk assessments of feed additives, nutritional and health claims. In addition,
310 draft documents, such as guidance on the safety assessment of genetically modified foods and feeds,
311 have been put onto the website for consultation prior to finalisation. These activities fit into EFSA's
312 strategy towards transparency, openness, and dialogue (EFSA, 2008).

313 **2.1.5. Proactive methods**

314 Most early warning systems currently in place are based on the detection / identification of a hazard
315 that is already known about. Hence, measures to circumvent the identified hazards will by definition be
316 reactive. Developments in analytical methodologies, as well as in reporting systems, including real
317 time reporting, may accelerate the time elapsed between the first detection of a hazard and the
318 decision to take measures to mitigate that hazard. In addition, systems that could predict the
319 development of a hazard would be beneficial for protection of human health since they would allow
320 proactive interventions in the food production system.

321

322 Kleter, Groot, Poelman, Kok & Marvin (2008a) considered various case studies of emerging chemical
323 and biochemical issues, including toxic botanical preparations, unauthorised genetically modified
324 organisms, antibiotics in farmed shrimp, contaminants in farmed salmon, and pesticides of natural
325 origin. These authors inferred general recommendations from these cases, including: i) the need to list
326 contaminants that may occur in particular food and feed product categories and for which different
327 requirements exist in importing and exporting countries; ii) the requirement for pro-active search for
328 the presence of the contaminants identified under i); and iii) imposition by exporting countries of quality
329 and safety control measures [e.g. Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP)], regulatory
330 requirements, and checks of consignments to be exported (Kleter et al., 2008a).

331

332 Another example of the proactive use of hazard identification within the food production chain is seen
333 in the HACCP approach. Hazard identification is a mandatory part of risk assessment in HACCP.
334 Within this approach, a food manufacturer, handler, or processor has to develop a diagram of the
335 production process and compile a risk assessment for the various microbiological, chemical, and other
336 hazards that may occur during food processing and handling. Based on this risk assessment, hazards
337 are identified that can be measured on a routine basis through critical control points within the
338 production process. In addition, threshold levels are set for quantitative outcomes of hazard
339 measurement, based upon which decisions have to be taken, such as whether to apply corrective
340 measures to reduce the occurrence of a certain hazard or to block a production batch from entering
341 the market. Such risk assessments should also take into account certain changes that may occur

342 within the production process and that could constitute emerging hazards. It appears likely that in
343 these cases, the risk assessments will primarily focus on known hazards.

344 **2.2. Vulnerability assessment**

345 The examples provided above mainly focus on the identification of specific hazards and the
346 subsequent actions to be taken. It can be envisaged, however, that the focus of identification is not
347 necessarily on a specific hazard *per se*, which has to be known or at least identifiable, but on the
348 points within the food supply chain where the introduction of hazards is most likely to occur. Thus the
349 HACCP has also to take hazard introduction into account when defining the control points in the food
350 manufacture process where already identified hazards can be measured. An example of an approach
351 focusing on vulnerable segments of the food production chain is the "CARVER-Shock" approach, a US
352 initiative developed to shield the food supply against threat of terrorist attacks and new dangers
353 (CARVER stands for Criticality, Accessibility, Recuperability, Vulnerability, Effect, and Recognisability).
354 The approach also has features that could be relevant for the identification of "classical" food safety
355 issues. No specific hazards are identified within this approach, but rather the parts called "critical
356 nodes" of the food production chain are identified that would be vulnerable to attack and potentially
357 lead to contamination with agents adversely affecting the health of consumers. In addition to the
358 identification of indicators, the analytical capabilities for detection and control of the hazards, as well
359 as countermeasures, including awareness raising, technology changes, and regulations, can be
360 formulated.

361

362 Application of the *vulnerability* approach requires the involvement of a team of experts across a wide
363 array of issues, including food microbiology, food technology, food chemistry, epidemiology, fraud,
364 threat intelligence, economics, risk assessment, medical science, entomology, veterinary health, plant
365 pathology, botany, and psychology (among others). These experts would focus on the production
366 chain for a specific product, mapping the "farm to fork" pathway in a flow diagram and compiling a
367 profile of the hypothetical attacker on the food chain. For each segment of the pathway in the flow
368 diagram, values ranging from 1 to 10 (with 10 being the highest impact) would be assigned to each of
369 various parameters of the CARVER-Shock model. The "Shock" component brings together the
370 CARVER components and considers the national non-technical impacts of the threat, including the
371 *psychological* and *economic* impacts.

372

373 The outcomes of a vulnerability assessment do not apply to a single company, but are of a more
374 general nature, pertaining to a particular sector of the food production chain (FDA, 2006).

375 **2.3. Futures research**

376 In *futures research*, various techniques are used in order to increase preparedness for future
377 developments. For example, the Australian Authorities for Veterinary Health (AFFA) and the Australian
378 Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) recently launched a “strategic foresight
379 initiative,” in which multiple plausible scenarios of the future were explored by groups of experts so
380 that timely response could be given to problems, including food safety issues, before they become
381 critical (DAFF, 2007). Similar initiatives on animal health have been undertaken in other countries,
382 including a quadrilateral initiative between the central veterinary offices of Canada, US, Australia, and
383 New Zealand. This initiative held a meeting in 2005 with stakeholders from various backgrounds on
384 alternatives for animal waste disposal. Four different scenarios for the year 2020 with varying degrees
385 of utilisation of animal materials and public concern were considered as “drivers” of change. These
386 scenarios took into account the predicted economic, political, technological, scientific, and educational
387 developments and aspects associated with each of these scenarios. The position of the current and
388 desirable future scenarios were considered, and how to reach the latter from the former in the form of
389 required policy change. The outcomes can aid the development of policies that take into account
390 various scenarios (Willis, 2006). It can be foreseen that as time progresses, evaluation of the
391 developments and possible re-adjustments of the selected strategy have to be applied. These
392 foresight activities are therefore more broadly orientated than the one-off stakeholder events described
393 above, which focus more on specific safety issues.

394

395 Another example of a futures research activity is “horizon scanning” by the United Kingdom (UK)
396 Department of Environment, Food, and Rural Affairs’ (DEFRA) Scientific Advisory Group. This activity
397 addresses future risks for which ideas are obtained both from scanning information sources and from
398 inputs after a public consultation. After the first round of a recent consultation, in which more than 500
399 suggestions had been submitted, five priority areas were identified, including food safety. Short-term
400 projects on future risks and opportunities were then initiated, one of which pertained to the key drivers
401 of the food economy of the UK in 2024, involving both desk studies and an expert workshop. Currently,

402 strategies for the continuation of horizon scanning are being reconsidered and essays have been
403 published on the methodology followed. Amongst others, it is noted that this type of futures research
404 entails the involvement of multidisciplinary teams, shared language for internal communications, and
405 clear guidance from a steering group (DEFRA, 2008).

406 **3. Problems with existing systems: Stakeholder views on emerging risk identification,** 407 **prevention and mitigation**

408 Although the contents of this review are largely based on the existing scientific literature, the views of
409 various international food safety experts regarding early risk identification were also elicited as part of
410 the SAFE FOODS project. These views were collected using the Delphi method (see Wentholt et al.,
411 2008). This method essentially involves the repeated polling of a variety of experts through a
412 questionnaire (in this case, Internet-based), in which experts' anonymous views are fed back in
413 successive "rounds" to help inform decision making across the whole group. The Delphi methodology
414 has the advantage of enabling the polling of multiple experts who might not otherwise be able to meet
415 in a formal group (because of time and place constraints), and improves upon the standard survey in
416 allowing a degree of interactivity through the provision of feedback and iterative use of a questionnaire.
417 Furthermore, by structuring the information exchange (*e.g.* using feedback anonymously, and giving
418 equal weight to all inputs) the method aims to pre-empt certain social and political problems
419 associated with group meetings (*e.g.* following the lead of the most powerful individual; agreeing with
420 the group to avoid sanction). Further discussion of the Delphi methodology is provided by Rowe and
421 Wright (1999).

422
423 In the present case, the Delphi method was applied to *two* different and distinct sets of stakeholders:
424 the first set comprised relevant stakeholders from within the EU; the second comprised relevant
425 stakeholders from outside the EU (non-EU). Two lists were developed, identifying potential participants
426 from four key constituencies: *food risk managers*, *risk assessors*, *members of Non-Governmental*
427 *Organisations* (NGOs) and *risk communicators*. Potential "panellists" received an E-mail invitation to
428 take part in the Delphi, informing them of the purpose of the study and what it would involve, and
429 emphasising that their opinions would be treated anonymously. The expert panellists were first sent a
430 questionnaire about the SAFE FOODS framework, and then were presented with a second survey
431 with similar questions, which they were asked to complete, reconsidering their views in the light of the

432 opinions expressed by the other panellists in the first round. The SAFE FOODS framework amongst
433 others consists of a revised risk analysis cycle consisting of various stages from identification of an
434 issue towards implementation of measures and their monitoring and reviews (SAFE FOODS, 2008).
435 The first-round Delphi questionnaires were very similar for both sets of stakeholders (EU and non-EU),
436 with only a few differences, mainly in phrasing. The second-round questionnaires diverged across the
437 two stakeholder groups as different key issues emerged (the questionnaires being informed by the
438 responses to the first rounds). A detailed analysis of the Delphi study, in particular related to the SAFE
439 FOODS framework, is provided elsewhere (Wentholt et al., 2008). However, a number of questions
440 within our survey allowed participants to comment upon issues salient to the identification of emerging
441 risks, as well as pertinent issues such as how to select and integrate experts into the process of
442 emerging risk identification, and these are discussed here.

443

444 The results from the Delphi survey elaborate a number of problems in dealing with "emerging risk" and
445 the requirements (or even feasibility) of a system to handle these. Participants were particularly unified
446 by their concern regarding the challenge of *predicting* unintended consequences and emerging risks
447 as opposed to picking these up through *monitoring*:

448

449 "If it is unexpected, you will not know." [EU participant]

450

451 "Unintended effects, by definition, cannot be predicted. They can only be considered in
452 retrospect after careful monitoring in cases where it is considered important. Case-by-case
453 depends on how much information comes from previous common use of similar situations. It
454 should only be important for radically new situations." [International participant]

455

456 As such, some participants wondered at the feasibility of a universal proactive system:

457

458 "It does not seem logical that better planning will provide more information about unintended
459 consequences. The monitoring system will have to consult with stakeholders on a case-by-
460 case basis." [EU participant]

461

462 "I would agree [with the identification of hazards in the Framing stage] when this is to the
463 extent that hazards are known and a rationale with the issue at hand can be substantiated on
464 existing knowledge. In [some] cases, this will not be possible as emerging issues are dealt
465 with or [treated as] new, yet unknown links [...] [between] hazards and issues might be in
466 play." [EU participant]

467

468 However, other participants did emphasise some features that might aid identification of emerging
469 risks. Responses from some highlighted the need for expert involvement, advocating the internet as a
470 tool to improve the process:

471

472 "I think that the identification of early warning indicators might be delegated to experts in (an)
473 assessment round." [EU participant]

474

475 "There needs to be clear institutional responsibility [for identifying unintended consequences],
476 e.g. a national directorate for food safety. This body should build up Internet-based and
477 publicly available sites for feedback and reports of unintended consequences." [EU
478 participant]

479

480 Explicit support for a more holistic approach incorporating different aspects of food safety (food
481 inspections, public health, trade) was expressed in the Delphi survey when experts were asked to
482 suggest measures that could be taken to identify unintended consequences of emerging food risks.

483

484 "Cooperate with e.g. Eurostat by incorporating e.g. inspection data etc." [EU participant]

485

486 "It is indeed key that any relevant information [...] also that on unintended consequences, is
487 fed back into the risk analysis. In the first instance, monitoring of unintended consequences
488 could be set-up on a case-by-case basis to make it somewhat more efficient to identify
489 stakeholders and existing surveillance systems that might pick up unintended consequences.
490 [EU participant]

491

492 More generally, it was thought important that any uncertainties within the food risk analysis process
493 are exposed and this is as true of early risk identification as the assessment of established risks.

494

495 "Risk assessment is a process of reasoning under uncertainty. It should define the degree of
496 uncertainty with which the decision maker has to work and requires an understanding of
497 probabilities. Uncertainty reduction can only be achieved by applying better forward planning
498 and use of available information; additional scientific research; stakeholders consultation
499 about unintended consequences and how these should be monitored; feeding back
500 information into the risk analysis process; a case-by-case basis; [and] general surveillance to
501 identify such consequences if they arise." [EU participant]

502

503 Within the SAFE FOODS Risk Analysis framework, the cycle incorporates the subsequent phases of
504 framing, assessment, evaluation, decision making, implementation, monitoring, and review. The risk
505 analysis process is considered to be cyclic (iterative) in nature, and so the outcomes of the final phase
506 feed back into the first phase of the following repeat of the process. Participants tended to agree that
507 the outcomes of the monitoring and review phases may lead to the identification of new issues, such
508 as unexpected trends in monitored hazards, and that these might then be considered during a new
509 framing phase in which policy makers, risk assessors, and stakeholders set out a strategy for further
510 risk analysis of the hazard under consideration. For example, it was noted that previously unidentified
511 or unexpected consequences of either food-safety-hazard- or food-safety-risk-mitigating measures
512 may be novel, and therefore need to be categorised as an emerging issue in their own right. As a case
513 in point, consumption of fish containing unsaturated fats may help reduce cardiovascular risks but
514 increase exposure to contaminations that commonly occur in fish, such as heavy metals and
515 persistent organic pollutants such as dioxins. Consideration of these unidentified or unexpected
516 consequences may help to identify emerging issues.

517

518 The following quotes are from various participants in the Delphi survey who commented on how a
519 cyclical process might reveal unidentified consequences leading to new issues to be considered in the
520 risk analysis, and they were generally favourable about the ability of the model to cope with emerging
521 issues due to this cyclical feature:

522

523 "Indicators for monitoring the consequences should be monitored by decision
524 makers/regulatory institutions and risk managers. These data should be provided to risk
525 assessors and those involved in the framing stage if these data indicate an unforeseen event."

526 [EU participant]

527

528 "[...] as a practical matter, risk managers should be doing environmental scans so as to be
529 able to identify new and emerging risks, and they must have some discretion as to which of
530 them seem to be sufficiently urgent to warrant further action." [International participant]

531

532 "The risk / benefit assessment needs to be constantly kept under review to take into account
533 new thoughts / data." [EU participant]

534

535 "I particularly appreciate the inclusion of the review stage - these processes are dynamic, as
536 they are part of societal learning, in a strategic sense - including the continuing need in all
537 societies for learning to cope with new knowledge and techniques [...]." [EU participant]

538

539 "Consultation with stakeholders should have the priority" with respect to a monitoring system
540 to consider unintended consequences of the hazard [EU participant]

541

542 "If you define the risk you are dealing with the sequence: 1) Identification of risks, costs,
543 benefits, and their distribution; 2) Risk profiling; 3) Identification of decision options; 4)
544 Developing criteria [for evaluation] is sensible but they will have to be risks, not identified
545 hazards." [EU participant]

546

547 In summary, the participants in the study tended to agree that the issue of identifying emerging food
548 safety issues is difficult, especially identifying these proactively as opposed to revealing them through
549 diligent monitoring. Indeed, unidentified consequences might emerge and be identified at various
550 stages of the risk analysis process. Existing early warning systems rely on the detection of a hazard in
551 monitoring programs and therefore by definition are reactive. Delphi participants indicated that more

552 proactive system would be desirable, if feasible, since the potential risk may be prevented by issuing
553 proper counter-actions. Among the features suggested as enabling better coping with emerging issues
554 is a more “holistic approach” that considers the wider context in which a particular hazard is being
555 assessed, and facilitates institutional ability to react rapidly, and emphasises on the use of expert
556 knowledge. Further, given that some respondents indicated they were unfamiliar with the terminology
557 linked with early warning and emerging issues, better communication about these is important in order
558 to provide all stakeholders involved with information relevant to reporting emerging issue which they
559 have identified.

560 **4. Developing emerging risk systems based on a “holistic approach”**

561 Various initiatives have attempted to develop predictive early warning systems based on signals
562 directly and indirectly related to a hazard, collected from both *within* and *beyond* the food production
563 chain – the “holistic approach.” It is argued that drivers of emerging food safety risks are often not
564 directly linked to the food production chain (for example, changes in climate conditions may lead to
565 new or re-emerging food safety issues and diseases), and that a plurality of factors should be taken
566 into account. Within the Periapt project (EU 6th Framework Programme; PeriApt, 2008) the *holistic*
567 *host environment strategy* has been proposed, advocating the need to take impacts from outside the
568 food production chain into account when developing pro-active emerging food safety identification
569 systems (Periapt, 2005). This initiative has built on innovations regarding proactive risk identification
570 identified in the OECD report “Emerging risks in the 21st Century” (OECD, 2003), a strategy which has
571 been further elaborated by research teams in the EU projects EMRISK and SAFE FOODS, and in a
572 Dutch national research program entitled “Emerging Risks in the Dutch Food Chain” (Achterbosch,
573 2007; Van der Roest et al., 2007). Within these projects, host environment analysis has been applied
574 to a large number of recent food safety issues (among others BSE, acrylamide, dioxin in fish and milk)
575 resulting in the identification of a large number of indicators within and beyond the food production
576 chain that were directly and / or indirectly related to the development of the specific issue being
577 studied. Hence, *indicators* are defined by EFSA as a measurement and / or observation that should be
578 reliable, sensitive, and quantifiable, and should provide the information of the nature of the hazard
579 (agent / process involved) and the source of risk (EFSA, 2007). Changes in such indicators are
580 defined as signals and may give rise to the development of a risk. Two groups of researchers recently
581 applied the recommended methodology to potential contamination of foods and feeds with mycotoxins

582 by identification of indicators within and outside the food and feed manufacture chains. This can be
583 regarded as a first step towards the establishment of a holistic early identification system for
584 mycotoxins (Park & Bos, 2007; Van der Fels – Klerx, Kandhai & Booij, 2008).

585

586 It has been suggested that awareness of the significance of these signals (*i.e.* changes in the
587 indicators) most probably could have contributed to an earlier recognition of the developing hazard,
588 which potentially could have prevented the occurrence of the food safety issue (VWA, 2006;
589 Hageaars et al., 2006; Kleter et al., 2008a). However, it has also been noted that it is unrealistic to
590 monitor all potentially relevant signals. To overcome the problem of many potentially relevant signals,
591 an expert group convened by EMRISK performed a ranking procedure using defined criteria to identify
592 the most important indicators. Two methods were tested, namely a decision tree approach and a
593 ranking system using weight factors. Based on the outcome of this comparison, it was concluded that
594 ranking procedures using weighting systems were preferable. Furthermore, this study observed that,
595 of all the indicators identified within EMRISK (*i.e.* 217), 16% were located in the sector Agriculture &
596 Fisheries, followed by Environment & Energy (14%), Population & Social Conditions (14%), and
597 Health (10%). The subsequent step proposed by EMRISK was to apply the so-called “traffic light”
598 theory for interpretation of trends associated with changes in signals. In this, the direction of change of
599 a signal is connected to a colour, *i.e.* green for a positive change / trend; red for a negative change /
600 trend; and yellow for a neutral / intermediate one. Furthermore, different urgency-weighting factors can
601 be assigned to signals with a different colour. EMRISK applied this principle to design an extended
602 flow diagram for a pre-early warning system, with both technical and human factors (the utilisation of
603 *search engines* and employment of *scientific experts*, respectively). The scientific experts had to
604 provide a description of each of the selected indicators so that computer software could formulate an
605 “indicative question,” and derived keywords serving as input for automatic searches of the Internet for
606 information. Subsequently, the information coming out of these searches needs to be assessed by
607 scientific and computing experts prior to selection of those items that require further risk management
608 measures.

609

610 Following the EMRISK report, the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) issued an opinion,
611 emphasising that networks of scientists are essential elements in the structure of early warning

612 systems if a food-borne hazard is to be identified at an early stage (EFSA, 2006). To generate enough
613 intellectual power to deal with a specific food safety case and / or to identify an emerging food safety
614 problem, it is preferable to link and combine existing relevant expert networks rather than developing a
615 large, new, comprehensive expert network. However, the harmonisation of existing networks must
616 ensure inclusion of all kinds of scientific disciplines (health, environment, societal, legal, economic)
617 that may be needed to tackle future food safety problems.

618

619 Maeda, Kurita & Ikeda (2006) developed an early warning support system for food safety risks that
620 comprises two subsystems - a "clearing house" for food safety risks and "Risk Path Finder." The
621 former is a comprehensive database with documents pertaining to food safety risks, which are
622 retrieved and selected from the Internet using a dedicated search engine and applying specially
623 designed algorithms. This information is required to determine possible paths from causes to
624 consequences, which is achieved with the Risk Path Finder tool. The outcome of this system provides
625 interrelationships between events and causes, which aid the risk manager to find all possible effects of
626 a specific event.

627

628 The Emerging Risk Detection Support System (ERDSS) is being developed by a multidisciplinary
629 research team in a Dutch project entitled "Emerging Risks in the Dutch Food Chain" (Achterbosch,
630 2007; Van der Roest et al., 2007). The objective of this research is to combine expert knowledge on
631 food production and changes in indicators in a system that will give a warning when increased risk
632 occurs for the development of a food safety problem. Due to the high complexity and novelty of this
633 approach, it was decided to focus on the salmon production chain.

634

635 Initially an extensive analysis of the salmon production chain was conducted, including an analysis of
636 its environment (indicator analysis) and interviews with key stakeholders (Van der Roest et al., 2007).
637 This study was complemented with information obtained from host environment analysis of several
638 food safety incidents in the fish production chain (Hagenaars et al. 2006; Kleter et al., 2008a; Van der
639 Roest et al., 2007). A large number of indicators were identified, both inside and outside the salmon
640 production chain. Data sources that can be used to generate a signal from changes in the indicator
641 were identified and coupled to the expert knowledge system. In this way, a relation can be made

642 between the development of a food safety problem and risks and changes in an indicator. In contrast
643 to the approach proposed in EMRISK, all indicators and data sources identified are used. All data
644 sources will be continuously monitored and changes are automatically fed into the system and used
645 by the system to assess the chance for the development of a food safety issue. In addition, ERDSS
646 will have the possibility to manipulate the input signals allowing the operators to conduct scenario
647 studies. This is particularly important for managers to investigate the effect of potential measures.
648 A schematic presentation of ERDSS is given in Figure 1. ERDSS is still in an experimental phase and
649 the applicability of such an approach will have to be demonstrated in the future.

650

651

652

Insert Figure 1 about here

653

654 **5. Description of identified steps in an ER system**

655 Whilst the characteristics and the aims of the various systems to identify emerging hazards in an early
656 stage of their development can vary, some general features that these systems share in common with
657 each other can be defined (see Figure 2).

658

659 The first step usually comprises a delineation of either the particular food products or sectors in which
660 the emerging hazards are to be addressed, or the particular types of hazards that are to be detected in
661 an early stage. The information sources that are linked to these particular items should be made
662 accessible, and a method chosen to process information. Indicators may have to be formulated if the
663 aim of the system is to detect and process signals related to changes in the indicators, as is for the
664 hazard identification systems already described. As before, multidisciplinary teams of experts can aid
665 in the formulation of which food products or hazards should be considered, or (further downstream),
666 which indicators should be selected (as has been done in the EMRISK project). The American
667 CARVER-Shock methodology provides an example of how a wide array of experts can be used to
668 identify the "critical nodes" of the food production chain that are sensitive to threats. The involvement
669 of external experts in initial identification of indicators (included as part of the "framing" stage in the
670 SAFE FOODS project) was also identified in the Delphi study.

671

672 The data from the information sources can also be used to construct plausible future scenarios, as
673 well as the measures chosen to anticipate and prepare for these scenarios, a topic relevant to the
674 development of futures research activities. It is important to note that the information can pertain to the
675 food production chain itself, as well as to the influential sectors which have impact on the food
676 production chain.

677

678 The second step comprises the generation of data from the information sources by using various
679 processing methods. For hazard identification systems, this may entail the measurement of signals
680 coming from indicators, retrospective analysis of trends, or the reporting of hazards through dedicated
681 reporting systems. Another route may be the search for information in media sources by automated
682 search algorithms, for example with the aid of indicative questions such as recommended by EMRISK.
683 The data collected need not be only directly related to the hazard under consideration, but also include
684 data from influential sectors that might indirectly affect the occurrence or magnitude of the hazard. The
685 latter is particularly valid in holistic systems. For futures research, this may comprise the identification
686 of measures that are important for preparedness for possible future events.

687

688 In the following and third step, the data resulting from the second step needs to be processed. Part of
689 this is amenable to automation, such as in the case of signals linked to indicators below or above a
690 pre-set threshold level. Furthermore, if multiple outcomes are considered, weighting factors may have
691 to be attached to these outcomes in order to reflect the relative importance of each of outcome for the
692 development of a specific hazard. In other cases, expert teams with a multidisciplinary composition
693 may be involved with the interpretation and selection of results. This may have the advantage that all
694 changes can be viewed in context, because not every change may signify a hazard. The process
695 required to evaluate emerging risks and to trigger a more comprehensive risk-benefit assessment was
696 suggested by Delphi respondents to include both risk assessors and managers.

697

698 Of course, in addition, combinations of automated selection procedures coupled to expert advice can
699 be envisaged, as recommended by the EMRISK report. In the case of horizon scanning or futures
700 research, a comparison can be made with the current actual status of food safety systems and what

701 should be done to fulfil the requirements formulated in the second step for preparedness for future
702 incidents.

703

704 In the fourth step, the outcomes can be summarised and the various options for follow-up actions
705 highlighted. Risk managers can use these inputs for decisions on how to mitigate the issues selected
706 after the first three steps for further risk management.

707

708 The ERDSS developed in the Netherlands aims to combine the four steps described above thereby
709 eliminating or minimising the filtering step needed in other systems to handle the huge amount of data.
710 Furthermore, full advantage of expertise is taken in ERDSS, which is collected from the literature and
711 through interviews with stakeholders. The ERDSS also enables inclusion of knowledge of various
712 aspects either directly or indirectly related to the food production chain.

713

714

Insert Figure 2 about here

715

716

717 **6. Conclusions**

718 Assurance of the safety of the food supply has been a priority in many constituencies in past years.
719 This may, in part, relate to the fact that various incidents have heightened general awareness of food
720 safety. These incidents have also highlighted the need for early identification of food safety issues
721 before they become real risks. In this review various methods and procedures have been discussed
722 that can be used to identify food safety issues at an early stage, including early detection and warning
723 systems, vulnerability assessment, and futures research. Usually, these methods and procedures
724 consider either hazards occurring within the food production chain or risks (disease) occurring among
725 consumers.

726

727 A Delphi survey on the new food risk analysis framework proposed by SAFE FOODS has shown that
728 respondents consider the detection of previously unidentified or unexpected effects of known hazards
729 or of risk-mitigating measures as a way to detect emerging issues. Whilst the respondents furthermore
730 acknowledged the important role of experts in identification and interpretation of the signals, they also

731 envisaged a role for information coming from stakeholders that are to be involved in risk analysis. In
732 addition, respondents indicated that information over and above food monitoring data can be useful for
733 this purpose.

734

735 It appears therefore that there is a need for a more holistic approach towards the early identification of
736 emerging food safety issues, involving other stakeholders besides risk managers and risk assessors,
737 as well as input data from sectors outside the food production chain. No holistic systems are yet in
738 place which can fulfil this function, whilst various initiatives have provided inputs for their development.
739 At the present time, an automated system based on the holistic approach (*i.e.* ERDSS) is currently
740 being developed within the frame of a scientific project sponsored by the Dutch government. Further to
741 this, a four-step approach is proposed for an early identification of food safety issues, which can be
742 partially automated, but which in all cases will require inputs from expert panels to select indicators,
743 hazards, weak points in the chain, and future scenarios (Figure 2). Expert advice will also be needed
744 to interpret the outcomes of the subsequent steps in which issues will be identified and reported, in
745 order to “filter” them and “translate” the data for risk managers, so that the latter can take appropriate
746 mitigating measures. This approach needs to be further refined in the future as experience
747 accumulates with various activities on emerging issues and their early identification and prevention.

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752 **Conflict of interest statement**

753 All authors are professionals employed by RIKILT - Institute of Food Safety, by Wageningen University,
754 and by the Institute of Food Research, and as such do not have any interests that may conflict with the
755 contents of the article above.

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945 **Tables and figures**

946 Captions:

947 Table 1: Classification of various approaches currently in place and amenable to address early

948 identification of food safety hazards

949 Figure 1: Emerging Risk Detection Support System (ERDSS)

950 Figure 2: Four identified steps in an ER system

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ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT

Table 1 Classification of various approaches currently in place and amenable to address early identification of food safety hazards

Reactive Systems (identification of problem as occurs)					
Type	Description	Domain of interest	Responsive?	Actors / experts involved	Examples
Early warning systems/ networks	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Centralised hazard database or electronic network that provides a platform for communication through which member states can alert each other about relevant hazards that may be disseminated (in real time potentially) 	Food safety Human / Animal disease (food-related);	Discretionary response; Reliant on actors' interpretations of posted data; No formal mechanism for action	Institutionalised forms of cooperation and hazard reporting at the national and international levels between policy makers and / or scientists	RASFF; CDC; ECDC; WHO (INFOSAN/GOARN); OIE
	<p><i>or:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Centralised database of health risk outcomes or electronic network of that provides a platform for communication through which experts, organisations, and public health authorities can report and discuss pertinent scientific issues in a protected area 	Food-borne disease Animal disease		Experts, organisations, public health authorities (Multi-disciplinary, though often self-selecting, without proper processes or forum of influence)	SINAPSE; CDTRs (from ECDC); Various Food Safety Networks

Combinatorial data systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Database that combines monitoring data and hazard / product data from several sources related to outcomes “from farm to fork” to validate and contextualise increases in the identified hazards • Involves advanced technologies, such as automated Internet search algorithms, for the identification and analysis of products and related food hazards may be used • May provide indicators for the early identification of emerging hazards 	Food and health generally	Discretionary response reliant on actors' interpretations of posted data; No formal mechanism for action	Multi-disciplinary, though presently rather specific (precise issues)	EUROSTAT; USDA APHIS CEI
Retrospective Applications (based on retrospective analysis of reactive systems)					
Retrospective analysis of reactive systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Retrospective analysis of early warning and combinatorial data systems in order to detect (long-term) trends associated with various steps in the production-consumption chain, possibly through modelling 	Food and health generally	Discretionary response reliant on actors' interpretations of posted data; No formal mechanism for action	Experts	Annual reports of RASFF, FVO, and food inspection agencies
Predictive Systems					

<p>Proactive hazard identification systems</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Involves predictive risk assessment to identify various potential hazards that may occur at critical points in the food process, which are then measured routinely. If hazards exceed quantitative threshold levels, measures to mitigate the hazard are rapidly initiated • Analytical methods and reporting systems may often involve real-time procedures to accelerate the implementation of a mitigation process 	<p>Safety of food products</p>	<p>Responsive only to pre-defined risks; Reliant on monitoring to identify pre-defined risks</p>	<p>Manufacturers / Producers – process / manufacturer specific</p>	<p>US- Wheat Fusarium Head Blight Prediction Centre; HACCP</p>
<p>Vulnerability assessment</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The process (<i>i.e.</i> food production chain) is divided into smaller segments, and the critical nodes that are sensitive towards hazards are identified. Indicators for hazards are identified and monitored, and countermeasures are formulated 	<p>Could be applied to food chains</p>	<p>Responsive only to threats that occur within the identified vulnerable areas; Reliant on monitoring to identify risks within defined vulnerable areas</p>	<p>Potentially multi-disciplinary and international approach, though not yet formalised in food domain</p>	<p>CARVER-Shock</p>

<p>Futures research</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Various techniques to increase preparedness for future developments, which involve one-off events or consultations with expert and / or stakeholder groups through meetings / web-based forums to exchange knowledge, discuss hazards and emerging risks, and in some cases prioritise identified hazards • <i>Strategic foresight initiatives</i> where expert groups explore multiple future scenarios that account for predicted developments. Policy changes are developed to reach desirable future scenarios given the predicted outcomes. • <i>Horizon scanning</i> for future risks based on information from public consultations, in order to identify priority areas and develop short-term projects (such as desk studies and expert workshops) to mitigate potential risks 	<p>Whatever issue of interest-address various problems</p>	<p>Discretionary response; Reliant on actors' interpretations of posted data; No formal mechanism for action</p>	<p>Events are various and widespread, including specific expert constituencies (likely to be multi-disciplinary and international), but lack of formal organisation</p>	<p>DEFRA horizon scanning; Australian/New Zealand/Canada/US veterinary health foresight; Dutch National Food and Consumer Product Authority event; EFSA's Stakeholder Consultative Platform; Delphi</p>
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
Figure 1: Emerging Risk Detection Support System (ERDSS)

Figure 2: Four identified steps in an ER system